|
About Z/Yen
History
Clients
People
Testimonials
Z/EALOUS
FAQ
Services
Strategy
Intelligence
Systems
SpecialiZm
Change management
Outsourcing
Sectors
Financial services
Technology
Not-for-Profit
Commercial
Public sector
Activities
GFCI
GIPI
The London Accord
Events
On-line surveys
c
Products
Compliance workstation
Benchmarking
Investment games
PPRISM
PropheZy
VizZy
Knowledge
Books
Articles
Research &
Presentations
Press
Now & Z/Yen
Media coverage
Press releases
Z/Yen imagery
Fun
Photo gallery
Caption competition
Humour
ExtZy
Links
Reading list
Risk/Reward surfing

© The Z/Yen Group of Companies 2008
| |
Ian Harris, Z/Yen Group Limited
Professor Michael Mainelli, Z/Yen Group Limited
[An edited version of this article first appeared as “The Winner Takes It
All” (tendering), Charity Finance, pages 40-41, Plaza Publishing Limited (February
2008)]
Charities increasingly find themselves
required to tender in order to win public sector contracts. Similarly,
charities increasingly require their suppliers to go through structured
tendering processes. But often those structured tendering processes are
inappropriate for the procurement situation, helping neither the buyer nor the
sellers. In this second of two articles for Charity Finance, Ian Harris
and Michael Mainelli of The Z/Yen Group examine “The Tender Trap” from the
perspective of charities who sell their services.
I Don’t Want To Talk About The Things We’ve Gone Through
Charities are increasingly adopting “public procurement”-style processes when
purchasing; that was the subject matter of the first Tender Trap article
(Charity Finance, December 2007). Yet charity people often complain to us about
the unreasonable and inappropriate demands of the public procurement processes
required of them to win public sector contracts. This Tender Trap article
discusses competitive tendering from the point of view of charities as sellers
of services.
While we grab another opportunity to recycle a well-known song title and its
lyrics, public-sector tenders often have very little to do with winning people
winning at all.
We shall provide some guidance on how to qualify your opportunities to tender,
such that you will hopefully decide not to bid on appropriate occasions.
And for those occasions when you decide to proceed with a competitive tender, we
provide guidance on how to identify the key decision maker(s) in the process.
The Winner Takes It All, The Loser Has To Fall
The principle of winner’s curse is that in a competitive tendering situation,
where the competitors have incomplete information about the exact costs and/or
value involved, the “winning” competitor nearly always under-prices their bid,
such that the “winner” is eventually disappointed. The disappointment
might not be actual losses (although in many cases, on a full-costing basis it
does result in real losses) but it does result in a lower than expected return.
One intriguing and somewhat counter-intuitive element of the winner’s curse is
that the larger the number of participants in the competition, the more
pronounced is the winner’s curse effect.
While economic theory suggests that rational contestants should price “known
unknowns” into their bids, experimental situations demonstrate that participants
can be familiar with the phenomenon of winner’s curse, yet repeatedly make the
same mistakes in subsequent experiments. In the real world, we often see
the same contestants caught out by the winner’s curse in fields such as mergers
and acquisitions (they rarely add value), auctions of scarce resources (for
example the 3G bandwidth auctions).
While we might tut-tut at corporate executives hubris and/or anomalous
decision-making behaviour, in many ways the phenomenon is even worse when
experienced by charities. Charities (perhaps unwittingly) frequently
disguise their winner’s curse losses through hidden subsidies from donated funds
on contracts that are supposed to be fully-funded. This is often hidden in
overheads or infrastructure costs, where large public sector contracts
(supposedly fully-funded) often put a substantial strain on already stretched
charity resources.
Where there is significant competition for a public service contract, charities
should be asking themselves very serious questions about why they should bid.
If a commercial provider is willing to provide the services to a specified,
requisite quality and the public sector is required to pick up the cost of that
service, why should a charity bid to do the same thing for less money? If
several organisations are bidding for the contract, it is even more likely that
the winner of the contest will be underpaid for the service. What benefit
is such a “win” delivering to a charity’s objectives?
But I Was A Fool, Playing By The Rules
Of course, there is no rule that says you have to bid for every opportunity that
potentially falls within your “patch”. Indeed, in our view, one of the most
likely reasons for people bidding in inappropriate situations is the mistaken
belief that you need to assert your territory whenever a contract comes up in
your field of work.
As adherents of our own advice, at Z/Yen (and many of our clients) assess
opportunities using a “Bid/No-Bid Decision Matrix”, with which we assess the
factors relevant to that critical decision – should we bid or not. A great
many competitive opportunities fail to make the grade on the basis of this
assessment. Naturally, the relevant factors vary from organisation to
organisation. The following table is an extract from the Bid/No Bid
Decision Matrix for a fictitious charity, For Pity’s Sake Care Services, which
provides domiciliary care for the needy.
Table One: Bid/No-Bid Matrix for fictitious charity “For Pity’s Sake Care
Services”
|
Bid/No-Bid Decision Matrix |
Opportunity: |
Ref: |
|
Bid Factors |
Bid
Factors Scoring Range |
Score |
|
Low
(0-3) |
Medium (4-6) |
High (7-10) |
|
Relevant experience |
|
|
Core |
7 |
|
Availability of resources |
|
Average |
|
5 |
|
Overall capability |
|
|
Superior |
7 |
|
Strategic Importance |
|
Moderate |
|
6 |
|
Emerging Need |
|
|
Very much so |
8 |
|
Urgent Need |
|
To some extent |
|
5 |
|
Key beneficiaries |
Not really |
|
|
3 |
|
Many beneficiaries |
|
|
Many |
7 |
|
Our offering unique |
No |
|
|
3 |
|
Value of “marker” bid |
|
Reasonable |
|
5 |
|
Contribution |
|
Full cost cover |
|
6 |
|
Customer relationship |
|
|
Well known to us |
7 |
|
Competition |
|
Open |
|
5 |
|
Bid resources |
|
Sufficient |
|
6 |
|
Number of bidders |
|
|
3 or fewer |
6 |
|
Market intelligence |
|
|
Thorough |
8 |
|
Total
Score (Bid threshold 100) |
94 |
In our experience, you need to set the bid
threshold reasonably high, as the winner’s curse phenomenon combined with the
natural optimism of enthusiasts leads most people to over-rate rather than
under-rate opportunities when using this type of matrix.
Remember to revisit the Bid/No-Bid Matrix if the goalposts move, which they very
often do in these tendering processes, and be prepared to quit if the numbers no
longer stack up for you. Don’t make the mistake gamblers often make of
being sucked deeper in to a game than intended – cut your losses by withdrawing
from a winner’s curse bid.
The Judges Will Decide, The Likes Of Me Abide
For some forms of vital work there is little or no alternative to tendering.
But when you do tender, you want to know as much as possible about the
competition and the decision-making process. The “Bid/No-Bid Matrix” is
actually a good discipline for finding out as much as you can about the process.
There is one aspect of the competitive selling situations that we consider to be
vitally important although it is often overlooked, which is “who is the key
decision maker”. In the late 1980’s we both worked for a firm that used the
phrase BUSCK – “buyer-user-shopper-chooser-key decision maker”, a phrase that
has always resonated with us. We cannot find a reference for it (so
apologies to anyone who deserves credit for inventing BUSCK), but in any case
the following diagram and text that follows is our own take on this form of
analysis.
Diagram 1: Buyer–User–Shopper–Chooser–Key Decision Maker (BUSCK)

In theory a buyer has a great deal of control over the purchasing process and
can spread the procurement net widely or narrowly. A shopper, on the other
hand, while they might make on the spot decisions, is probably not controlling
the procurement process and is probably only looking at choices within the
constraints of options presented to them. A chooser is often a
professional procurement person (sometimes an external consultant) who might
ensure that the appropriate range of choices is presented but might have little
control over the decision making beyond that. A user is the person or
people who, on the other hand, might have a great deal of control over the
procurement process (e.g. substantial input into writing the specification) but
often has little input to the choices that are eventually made.
Of course, in many cases one individual fulfils more than one of those four
roles. If one individual fulfils several of the roles, you might well have
identified your key decision maker. But when the roles are well spread
between several individuals, it can be very difficult to work out who the key
decision maker is. Only occasionally does the decision really get made
collectively by a selection panel; more frequently than you might realise there
is a key decision maker who ultimately makes the decision. If you are
speaking that person’s language you are more likely to win, so it is extremely
helpful to at least try and identify who that person is and what will motivate
them to select you.
It is important, where possible, to have formed your BUSCK assessment some time
before the invitation to tender drops into your in-box. Ideally you want
those prospective clients to know you well enough that they are only going to
invite you to tender in circumstances which are genuinely suitable for both
parties. And of course you would like the proposal to play to your
strengths, which is all the more reason for you to seek dialogue before the
specification is finalised.
But You See, The Winner Takes It All
To summarise this second part of the Tender Trap, here is another mini
manifesto, this time for the selling side of the charity:
-
the sweetest bid of all is often not to bid – remember how often the
winner will suffer from winner’s curse. Winner’s curses (unlike sour
grapes) are best savoured when you’ve not bid at all;
-
know when to quit a tendering process, especially if the goalposts move
in an unfavourable direction during the process;
-
ensure you have enough information about your prospective clients to
minimise the risk of winner’s curse in your case;
-
bid when tendering processes should favour you, i.e. when you know that
key decision makers at the prospective client are inviting you to bid,
because they know that you actively seek such work and that you should be
well-equipped to do the work well.
|
Ian Harris and Professor Michael Mainelli are Directors of Z/Yen
Group Limited, a risk/reward management practice, dedicated to helping
organisations prosper by making better choices (www.zyen.com). Z/Yen
clients include blue chip companies in banking, insurance, distribution
and service companies as well as many charities and other
non-governmental organisations. |
|